It has been one year since the people’s revolution ignited on Egyptian streets leading to the iconic Tahrir Square. The euphoria of the revolution has been tempered by the reality of a deeply entrenched system that permeates government institutions, society and individuals. It is now apparent that there are two main yet broad contributions to the revolution: the political awakening among various segments of society, particularly the youth, who broke the fear barrier that was naturally instilled in many dictatorial settings; and the exposure of the roots of a cancerous regime that only tricks parts of the body that it healed itself without treatment. I would be remiss to not mention that Egypt’s revolution was at its core a mass movement that was leaderless, but one that nevertheless did not experience a power vacuum.  Indeed, the Egyptian revolution precipitated a coup d’etat by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) as “damage control” to save the remnants of a system in which it had so much at stake. The details of the relationship between the military and the Mubarak regime is intricate and deserves its own post, thus, I will delve in it later.

Tunisia, however, also saw the military playing a key role in the removal of Ben Ali when it sided with the revolutionaries. So why did SCAF not follow suit and hand over powers to a transitional civilian council composed of experts, politicians, and representatives of various segments of society much like the Higher Authority for the Achievement of Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition in Tunisia? Why did SCAF include articles that transferred greater power to itself in a referendum under the guise of constitution first or later? Why does SCAF accuse the same activists, protesters and civil society actors who were the core of the revolution of being “thugs” and foreign agents? Why does SCAF crack down on rights organizations for lack of transparency while it takes $1.3 billion from the U.S. in military aid that is not subject to parliamentary oversight? The answers to these questions are much more complicated than “the military generals want to rule Egypt.”  This suggestion would dismiss their substantive interests that were built over the last 60 years for some abstract idea of political ambition, even if they eventually fall into this position. It is also clear from the parliamentary elections that the political structure of Mubarak’s regime has taken a hit, so this is not a mere return to the Felool (remnants of the regime) either. Egypt is embarking on a new system, but the military council is a body that seeks to ensure its survival beyond any one ruler. Unfortunately, I will not delve into the transformation of the military over the past three regimes (at least not now), but I will point out the crucial Military-Enterprise Complex in Egypt, in the form of the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO), which is both a taboo subject and a pervasive entity insofar as it is tied with foreign relations, economic stagnation and internal politics. Zeinab Abul-Magd writes a very crucial and enlightening article on this in Jadaliyya.

In short, NSPO was created by former President Anwar Sadat to mollify the generals, who had up to the Camp David Treaty been key actors in both Nasser and Sadat’s regimes. The NSPO funnels foreign military aid into enterprises such as military-brand gas stations, factories, hotels, food products and everyday needs. The oversight on the aid and the industries would likely expose an economically unsound, corrupt, rotten and draconian system run by the military. As such, SCAF has two central needs and demands to ensure its future in the next phase in Egypt: immunity from prosecution in crimes committed throughout the revolution, and supra-constitutional principles that circumvent any process of transparency or budgetary oversight over military aid. The Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which now controls nearly 45% of the People’s Assembly, has already vaguely suggested granting SCAF immunity to ensure a peaceful transition to civilian rule – a compromise that will be harder on revolutionaries and the families of victims than any other segment of society. The latter demand, however, remains an explosive subject that threatens both the economic stability of the next phase of the transition in which parliament allegedly plays a bigger role, and the lifeline of a military council that makes more money off of being businessmen than generals. In spite of any deals or promises, SCAF’s compromises with FJP have only sparked the ire of revolutionaries, who are keen on a full democratic transition, and to dismiss the young activists as crucial actors is to fall into the same traps as Mubarak. Indeed, SCAF, which conspicuously unveiled itself as the guarantor of the revolution early on now stands to be the main obstacle to a democratic transition – not merely in the question of giving up power, but in its problematic choice between its financial institution and Egypt’s economic well-being that is the livelihood of the majority young Egyptians.